Landmark VA Disability Precedents
A curated guide to the court decisions every veteran and accredited representative should know.
How VA "Precedent" Actually Works
VA adjudication isn't pure stare decisis like trial courts, but precedent does bind the agency in a clear hierarchy:
- Supreme Court & Federal Circuit decisions are binding on the VA, the Board (BVA), and the CAVC. Procopio, Henderson, Kisor, Wagner — VA cannot ignore these.
- CAVC panel and en banc decisions are binding precedent on the Board and on VA adjudicators.
- CAVC single-judge memorandum decisions are not precedential — they bind only the parties to that case.
- BVA decisions themselves are NOT precedent, even at the Board level. Each case is decided on its own merits — which is why a veteran can't cite "another vet won on the same facts."
- VA General Counsel Precedent Opinions (Pr. Op.) are binding on VA adjudicators under 38 C.F.R. § 14.507 — internal precedent for the agency.
Kisor v. Wilkie
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)
Holding
Limited Auer deference: courts defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation only when the regulation is genuinely ambiguous and the interpretation is reasonable.
Why it matters
Reduced VA's ability to win cases simply by reinterpreting its own regulations. Veterans now have stronger ground to challenge VA's reading of 38 C.F.R.
Procopio v. Wilkie
913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc)
Holding
Blue Water Navy veterans who served within the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Vietnam are entitled to the Agent Orange presumption of exposure.
Why it matters
Reopened the door for tens of thousands of Blue Water Navy veterans previously denied. Led directly to the Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019.
Saunders v. Wilkie
886 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
Holding
Pain alone, without an underlying diagnosed condition, can constitute a 'disability' under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 if it reaches a level of functional impairment of earning capacity.
Why it matters
Reversed decades of VA practice that denied claims labeled 'pain without diagnosis.' Veterans with chronic pain — back, joints, headaches — can pursue service connection even without a definitive diagnosis.
Sharp v. Shulkin
29 Vet. App. 26 (2017)
Holding
When a flare-up is not observed during the exam, the examiner must elicit information from the veteran and other sources to estimate functional loss during flares — and explain if estimation is impossible.
Why it matters
Stops examiners from writing 'unable to opine without resort to speculation' as a default. They must actually try.
Correia v. McDonald
28 Vet. App. 158 (2016)
Holding
Joint exams must include range of motion testing in active motion, passive motion, and in weight-bearing and non-weight-bearing positions where applicable, per 38 C.F.R. § 4.59.
Why it matters
Most pre-Correia joint exams are now considered inadequate. Claimants can request a new exam or appeal on this basis.
Geib v. Shinseki
733 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
Holding
The Board, not a medical examiner, makes the ultimate TDIU determination. A medical opinion saying a veteran 'can work' is not dispositive.
Why it matters
Stops VA from rubber-stamping a denial because the C&P examiner checked 'employable.' TDIU requires a holistic Board analysis.
Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki
713 F.3d 112 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
Holding
A higher mental health rating requires both the kind of symptoms contemplated AND the corresponding level of overall occupational/social impairment.
Why it matters
Refined Mauerhan. To get 70% you need symptoms of similar severity AND deficiencies in most areas — not just one or the other.
Mitchell v. Shinseki
25 Vet. App. 32 (2011)
Holding
Painful motion alone does not entitle a claimant to a higher rating; pain must actually result in functional loss to support an increased rating under DeLuca.
Why it matters
Refined DeLuca by requiring documentation of how pain causes lost function — degrees of motion lost, specific activities limited.
Henderson v. Shinseki
562 U.S. 428 (2011)
Holding
The 120-day deadline to appeal a Board decision to the CAVC is not a jurisdictional bar — equitable tolling may be available in extraordinary circumstances.
Why it matters
A late notice of appeal isn't automatically dead. Veterans with serious medical or other circumstances may still get review.
Rice v. Shinseki
22 Vet. App. 447 (2009)
Holding
TDIU is part of an increased-rating claim whenever evidence of unemployability is raised by the record — VA cannot require a separate TDIU application.
Why it matters
If you mention you can't work because of your service-connected condition, TDIU is on the table automatically. VA must develop and adjudicate it.
Clemons v. Shinseki
23 Vet. App. 1 (2009)
Holding
A claim for one mental health condition (e.g., PTSD) is a claim for any mental health condition the evidence supports — VA cannot deny on the basis that the diagnosis differs from what was claimed.
Why it matters
If you claim PTSD but get diagnosed with depression or anxiety, VA must adjudicate the actual diagnosis — not deny because the label changed.
Moore v. Shinseki
555 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
Holding
VA's duty to assist requires reasonable efforts to obtain federal records, including service treatment records, until they are obtained or shown to not exist.
Why it matters
Veterans whose STRs are 'lost' or 'fire-related' have stronger leverage to demand alternative-source development and a heightened benefit of the doubt.
Thun v. Peake
22 Vet. App. 111 (2008)
Holding
Established the three-step framework for extraschedular ratings under 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1): inadequate schedular rating, exceptional disability picture, marked interference with employment or frequent hospitalization.
Why it matters
When the rating schedule doesn't capture how disabling a condition really is, Thun is the path to a higher extraschedular rating.
Jandreau v. Nicholson
492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
Holding
Lay persons are competent to identify medical conditions in limited circumstances — those involving simple identification, contemporaneous diagnosis, or symptoms supporting a later diagnosis.
Why it matters
Established the 'Jandreau competency' framework. A veteran can credibly testify to a broken bone, ringing in ears, or visible scar without an expert.
Barr v. Nicholson
21 Vet. App. 303 (2007)
Holding
Once VA undertakes to provide an exam, the exam must be adequate. An inadequate exam frustrates judicial review and requires remand.
Why it matters
Foundation case for challenging C&P exams. Inadequate exam = remand for a new one.
Hart v. Mansfield
21 Vet. App. 505 (2007)
Holding
Extended Fenderson staged-rating doctrine to increased-rating claims, not just initial claims.
Why it matters
Even on an increase claim, the Board must consider whether the rating should change over the appeal period.
Buchanan v. Nicholson
451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
Holding
VA cannot reject lay evidence (a veteran's own statements about symptoms) solely because contemporaneous medical records do not corroborate it.
Why it matters
Protects veterans whose in-service symptoms were never documented. Lay statements about onset and continuity must be weighed, not dismissed.
McLendon v. Nicholson
20 Vet. App. 79 (2006)
Holding
VA must provide a medical exam when there is (1) competent evidence of current disability, (2) evidence of in-service event, (3) an indication the two may be associated, and (4) insufficient medical evidence to decide.
Why it matters
Sets the low threshold for triggering VA's duty to provide a C&P exam. If VA refuses an exam, McLendon is the case to cite.
Shedden v. Principi
381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Holding
Restated and refined the elements required to establish direct service connection, reinforcing Caluza in the Federal Circuit context.
Why it matters
Often cited alongside Caluza when arguing the three-element test. Useful when appealing to the Federal Circuit on service-connection theory.
Wagner v. Principi
370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Holding
Where a condition was not noted on entrance and the veteran was presumed sound, VA must rebut soundness with clear and unmistakable evidence that the condition pre-existed AND was not aggravated by service.
Why it matters
Stops VA from denying claims by simply asserting a condition pre-existed service. The presumption of soundness is a powerful tool for veterans.
Mauerhan v. Principi
16 Vet. App. 436 (2002)
Holding
The symptoms listed in the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders are examples, not an exhaustive list. The Board must consider all symptoms and overall occupational/social impairment.
Why it matters
Stops VA from denying a higher mental health rating because a veteran doesn't have the exact symptom list. Functional impairment is what matters.
Maxson v. Gober
230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
Holding
A long gap between separation and the first documented complaint is evidence VA may weigh against continuity of symptomatology — but it is not dispositive.
Why it matters
Frequently cited by VA to deny chronic-condition claims. Veterans need to address the gap with lay statements, treatment records, or alternative explanations.
Fenderson v. West
12 Vet. App. 119 (1999)
Holding
Created 'staged ratings' for initial-rating appeals — VA must consider whether different ratings are warranted at different periods since the effective date.
Why it matters
If your condition was worse in year 1 than year 3, you can get a higher rating for that earlier period rather than a single flat rating.
Caluza v. Brown
7 Vet. App. 498 (1995)
Holding
Established the three-element test for direct service connection: (1) current disability, (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation, and (3) medical nexus linking the two.
Why it matters
The 'Caluza triangle' is still the foundation cited in nearly every service-connection decision today. Missing any one element typically results in denial.
Allen v. Brown
7 Vet. App. 439 (1995)
Holding
Secondary service connection is available for any increase in severity of a non-service-connected condition that is proximately due to or aggravated by a service-connected disability.
Why it matters
The foundation of secondary aggravation claims — e.g., service-connected knee causing non-service-connected back to worsen.
DeLuca v. Brown
8 Vet. App. 202 (1995)
Holding
Musculoskeletal exams must address functional loss due to pain, weakness, fatigability, incoordination, and lack of endurance — including during flare-ups and after repetitive use.
Why it matters
The 'DeLuca factors' are required in every joint/spine C&P exam. Examiners who skip them produce inadequate exams that can be challenged on appeal.
Layno v. Brown
6 Vet. App. 465 (1994)
Holding
Distinguished 'competent' from 'credible' lay evidence. Lay testimony is competent regarding observable facts but not specialized medical diagnoses.
Why it matters
Cited constantly to define the limits of buddy statements and self-reports. Knowing what a lay witness can and can't establish shapes how veterans should write statements in support of claim.
Combee v. Brown
34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
Holding
A veteran is not precluded from establishing direct service connection for a condition with proof of actual causation, even if the condition is on a presumptive list with unmet criteria.
Why it matters
If a presumption (Agent Orange, PACT Act, Gulf War) doesn't apply, direct service connection is still on the table with the right evidence.
Gilbert v. Derwinski
1 Vet. App. 49 (1990)
Holding
When evidence is in approximate balance, the benefit of the doubt under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) belongs to the veteran. The standard is 'equipoise,' not preponderance.
Why it matters
The bedrock benefit-of-the-doubt rule. When VA says 'evidence is roughly balanced,' the veteran wins — period.
General education only
These summaries are not legal advice and do not establish an attorney–client or claims-representation relationship. Court holdings evolve; verify any case before relying on it in a brief or appeal. Oakridge Claims is a VA-accredited claims agent service — we are not a law firm.